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Abstract
Does media content influence local institutions? We study this question by looking at how
a negative shock to local crime-related news, induced by the acquisition of local TV stations
by the Sinclair Broadcast Group, affects U.S. municipal police departments. In particular,
we implement a triple differences-in-differences design that exploits the staggered timing of
acquisitions 2010-2017, together with cross-sectional variation in whether municipalities are
covered by local news at baseline, a proxy for exposure to the shock. First, using a newly
collected dataset of 300,000 transcripts of local newscasts, we document that once acquired
by Sinclair, TV stations decrease news coverage of local crime. Second, we find that after
Sinclair enters a media market, municipalities that were likely to be in the news at baseline
experience 8% lower violent crime clearance rates with respect to municipalities that were
very rarely in the news in the first place. The main mechanism we propose is that the change in
content induces police officers to decrease the effort allocated to clearing violent crimes, due
to a decline in the salience of crime as an issue in the public opinion.
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1 Introduction
Law enforcement is one of the most important functions of U.S. local governments, yet we have a
limited understanding of what forces shape the incentive structure of police departments (Owens
(2020)). In recent years, high-profile cases of police misconduct have cast doubts on the extent to
which officers, who are protected by civil service laws and strong union contracts, are responsive
to the constituencies they serve. In this paper, we explore a fundamental force that might play a
role in this respect: local media.
Studying the effect of local media on police is a first order question. By providing information to
the public, the media have the potential to influence the behavior of bureaucrats and politicians (see,
among others, Lim et al. (2015); Snyder Jr and Strömberg (2010); Martin and Yurukoglu (2017)).
This is especially true at the local level, where news have large viewerships and garner high levels
of trust (Mitchell et al. (2016)). In addition, local news often have a clear crime focus. This,
combined with the highly decentralized nature of law enforcement in the U.S., makes local media
uniquely positioned to play a role in influencing the behavior of police officers.
In this paper, we study how changes in TV news coverage of a municipality’s crime impact the
behavior of its police officers, as proxied by clearance rates. More precisely, we exploit the fact
that, in the last ten years, the local TV market in the U.S. has seen an increase in concentration
driven by large broadcast groups acquiring high numbers of local TV stations, and acquisitions
are likely to affect content (Stahl (2016)). We focus in particular on the most active player in this
sense: the Sinclair Broadcast Group.
Sinclair acquisitions affect content in two ways. First, Sinclair tends to reduce local news coverage
in favor of a national focus (Martin and McCrain (2018)). This is the effect we are interested
in estimating, as it allows us to identify the effect of a change in the TV news coverage of a
municipality’s crime. However, Sinclair – a right-leaning media group – is also likely to introduce
more conservative content overall. Our empirical strategy exploits the staggered timing of Sinclair
entry across media markets. But, to disentangle the two effects on content highlighted above, we
combine this with cross-sectional variation across municipalities in exposure to the decline in news
coverage in a triple differences-in-differences design.
Our proxy for exposure is the baseline probability that a municipality appears in the news. The
intuition is that the decline in coverage driven by acquisitions should only matter for municipalities
that are likely to appear in the news in the first place. Instead, municipalities that are never in
the news should not experience a change in local coverage, and therefore function as our control
group. Importantly, the presence of this control group has the additional advantage of allowing us
to control for endogeneity in Sinclair entry.
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We begin by documenting how Sinclair acquisitions affect local TV content using a novel dataset
that includes 9.5 million stories part of 300,000 newscasts. This dataset allows us to track 323 local
TV stations weekly from 2010 to 2017. We use the content data to study how crime coverage of
the media market’s municipalities is affected by the Sinclair acquisitions. We identify crime stories
using a pattern-based sequence-classification method that classifies a story to be about crime if it
contains a "crime bigram." That is, if it contains a bigram that is much more likely to appear in
crime-related stories of the Metropolitan Desk Section of the New York Times than in non-crime
related ones. In addition, we assign stories to municipalities based on whether the name of the
municipality is mentioned in the story.
We find that ownership matters for content: once acquired by Sinclair, local TV stations decrease
news coverage of local crime. In particular, covered municipalities are 2.4 percentage points less
likely to be mentioned in a crime story after a station gets acquired by Sinclair with respect to
non-covered municipalities.1 The effect is significant at the 1% level and economically important,
corresponding to 27% of the outcome mean in 2010. Interestingly, examining the timing of content
changes, we find a reduction in local crime coverage immediately in the year following the acqui-
sition, with the effect increasing with time. The change in coverage is the result of an editorial
decision on part of Sinclair, partly explained by the centralization of news production. Consistent
with this, other stations in the same media market do not change their crime coverage after Sinclair
entry.
We then turn our attention to how the change in news coverage of local crime impacts clearance
rates. We find that after Sinclair enters a media market, covered municipalities experience 3.9
percentage points lower violent crime clearance rates with respect to non-covered municipalities.
The effect is precisely estimated, and corresponds to 8% of the baseline mean. Using an event-
study specification, we find no difference between covered and non-covered municipalities in the
two years before Sinclair acquires control over the station. The effect appears within the first year
since treatment, but becomes smaller over time.
In contrast, property crime clearance rates do not experience a similar decline. This heterogeneity
can be explained by the fact that local TV news have a clear violent crime focus. We document
this in our data by training a classifier model to identify whether local crime stories are about a
violent or a property crime. We show that 75% of local crime stories are about a violent crime
and only 16.7% are about a property crime, a difference which is even starker if we consider that
property crimes are more common by orders of magnitude. In this sense, the content data are one
of the most novel contributions of this paper: they provide the ability to characterize in detail the
1We define covered (non-covered) municipalities to be municipalities that are mentioned in the news more (less)
than the median municipality in 2010 using our content data.
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content shock, and therefore allow us to precisely map specific content changes into the real-word
outcomes we are interested in studying.
The effect on violent crime clearance rates is not explained by changes in violent crime rates.
However, we find some evidence of an increase in property crime rates after Sinclair entry. We
also do not find evidence of the decrease in crime coverage affecting police violence, although we
cannot draw strong conclusions because of the imprecision of our estimates in this case.
The main mechanism that we propose is the following. When Sinclair acquires a local TV station,
stories about a municipality’s violent crimes are less frequent and crime becomes less salient for
local citizens. As the pressure that citizens put on the police to solve these crimes decreases, police
officers reallocate their effort away from clearing these types of crime in favor of other policing
related activities. Two main pieces of evidence are consistent with this explanation. First, we use
data on monthly Google searches containing the terms "crime" and "police" to show that indeed,
after Sinclair enters a media market, the salience of these issues declines. Second, we note that the
key audience of local news, individuals over 55 years of age, are also an important interest group
for local politics and law enforcement in particular (Goldstein, 2019). Consistent with this, we
find that the effect is driven exactly by those municipalities where individuals over 55 years of age
constitute a larger share of the population. We interpret this evidence as supporting the idea of a
feedback mechanisms from salience to police behavior through local citizens’ action.
Alternatively, it is possible that the effect might be explained by explicit monitoring of the police.
If police officers anticipate a lower probability of appearing in the news if they fail to solve a
crime, they might shirk. We find this explanation to be less convincing because the decline in
crime reporting appears to be almost entirely driven by stories about crime incidents as opposed to
stories that are arrest-related, thus not changing the probability of delays in solving a crime being
the subject of a story. The same result also suggests that it is unlikely that perceptions of police
are negatively affected by the content change, which makes it unclear why community cooperation
with the police should be affected by Sinclair entry.
A long tradition in the economics of media literature shows that the media influence the behavior
of public officials, especially by performing an important monitoring function (Ferraz and Finan
(2011); Lim et al. (2015); Snyder Jr and Strömberg (2010). In addition, media content has been
shown to impact individuals’ perceptions and beliefs (Mastrorocco and Minale (2018)), as also
reflected by voting (DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007); Martin and Yurukoglu (2017); Durante et al.
(2019)). We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, our extensive content data allow us to
precisely document location-specific content changes and their timing following acquisitions. As
a result we can exactly map out how content influences policy. Second, in the discussion of the
mechanisms, we provide evidence on how media-induced changes in perceptions impact the behav-
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ior of public officials. The two papers that are closest to ours in this respect are Galletta and Ash
(2019) and Ash and Poyker (2019), which study how FOX News entry influences local govern-
ment spending and judges’ sentencing decisions; they also show that the way in which the media
influence preferences might have a policy impact. We add to these papers by studying how local
TV news content might influence crime perceptions and therefore police behavior.
In addition, our finding that Sinclair acquisitions affect local coverage shows that, differently than
for other media markets (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)), ownership of local TV stations matters
for content. This highlights how important it is to understand the consequences of the increasing
trend in concentrated media ownership (Stahl (2016)). Consistent with existing work in this area
(Martin and McCrain, 2018), we confirm that large broadcast group acquisitions lead to a crowding
out of local news in favor of national stories. Given that our content data span multiple years, we
are able to map out how acquisitions affect content changes over time. In addition, we investigate
the consequence of this highly policy-relevant trend for the behavior of public officials.
Finally, we contribute to the growing literature aimed at understanding the functioning of po-
lice departments (see, among others, Ba, 2018; Dharmapala et al., 2019; Facchini et al., 2020;
Harvey and Mattia, 2019; Goldstein et al., 2020; Mas, 2006; Mastrobuoni, Forthcoming; McCrary,
2007; Stashko, 2020). Ours is one of the first studies to provide evidence on how media content
influences the behavior of police officers. It is interesting to contrast our finding that decreases
in local TV news coverage of a municipality’s crime lower clearance race with the evidence that
increases in monitoring following scandals can sometimes have the same effect (Ba and Rivera
(2019); Premkumar (2020); Devi and Fryer Jr (2020)). The two results can be rationalized by the
attention change being of a very different nature: negative outside pressure following scandals
is likely to be very different than increases in crime salience driven by media coverage of crime
incidents.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the background, section 3
presents the data, and section 4 discusses the empirical strategy. The main results of the effect of
Sinclair on local news is presented in section 5, and the results of the effect of Sinclair on police
behavior is provided in section 6. Section 7 presents the robustness checks and section 8 discusses
potential mechanisms. Finally, section 9 concludes.
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2 Background
2.1 Local TV News
Although its popularity has been declining in recent years, local TV news remains a central source
of information for many Americans. In a 2017 Pew Research Center Report, 50% of U.S. adults
reported often getting their news from television, a higher share than those turning to online sources
(43%), the radio (25%), or print newspapers (18%) (Gottfried and Shearer, 2017). Among TV
sources, news stories airing on local TV stations have larger audiences than those on cable or other
networks (Matsa, 2018).
The overarching narrative regarding the decline in TV news masks substantial heterogeneity, with
the decrease in viewership being limited outside the top-25 media markets (Wenger and Papper,
2018b). Local TV news still plays an important role in small and medium sized markets, not only
in terms of viewership but also because there tend to be fewer outlets such as newspapers producing
original news focusing on the area (Wenger and Papper, 2018a).
In addition, the decline has been concentrated in younger demographics, while the core audience
of local TV news – those above 50, who constitute 73% of viewership – has been not been strongly
affected (Wenger and Papper, 2018a). Considering that local TV news also tends to garner the
highest levels of trust from the public (Mitchell et al., 2016), they constitute an important news
source that has the potential to shape public information and perceptions.
What are local TV newscasts about? Our content data allow us to provide a precise answer to the
question. Newscasts of local TV stations include both national and media market-specific stories.
As we show in Figure I Panel (a), approximately 30% of stories are specific to the media market,
in that they mention at least one same media market municipality with more than 10,000 people.
Crime is a prime subject of local TV stations newscasts: almost 25% of local stories are crime-
related (13% overall).2
To have a more complete picture of the breakdown of topics covered in local TV news, we also
trained an unsupervised LDA topic model on the 1.8 million local stories in our content data.
Appendix Figure I shows word clouds with the 50 words that have the highest weight for each of
the resulting five topics, which can be easily identified to be related to crime, events (also possibly
a filler topic), politics, weather, and sports. In Figure I Panel (b), we show the average topic share
across all local news stories. Again, the most covered topic in local stories is crime (26%), followed
by local events (23%), and politics (21%). Weather and sports also appear in local stories, although
2We discuss in detail the content data and the methodology we use to identify crime stories in the following section.
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to a lesser extent. Given the crime focus of local TV newscasts, studying the relationship between
local news and police departments appears to be first order.
2.2 The Sinclair Broadcast Group
Since 2010, the local TV market has seen the emergence of large broadcast groups owning a sig-
nificant share of local TV stations (Matsa, 2017). As broadcast groups centralize news production
in an effort to cut costs, acquisitions have the potential to significantly affect news content (Stahl,
2016). Consistent with this, existing research has shown that acquisitions are often associated with
a decrease of local news coverage (Martin and McCrain, 2018).
This paper focuses on the most active player in the local TV market: the Sinclair Broadcast Group.
Figure II shows the number of local TV stations under Sinclair control monthly from 2010 to 2017.
Over the period considered, Sinclair expanded from 33 stations in January 2010 to 117 stations in
December 2017, which corresponds to about 14% of all big-four affiliates. As shown in Figure III,
acquisitions have taken place in media markets across the United States, although Sinclair was
particularly active in medium-sized media markets.
With respect to other broadcast groups, the conservative leaning Sinclair appears to be particularly
interested in controlling the messaging of its local stations (New York Times (2018)), which gives
them even stronger incentives to move away from local towards national coverage. Consistent with
this, Martin and McCrain (2018) use a differences-in-differences design to show that when Sinclair
acquired Bonten in 2017, Bonten stations started covering more national news to the detriment of
local news, and their ideological slant shifted significantly to the right. Sinclair’s conservative
leaning might have real word effects: as shown by Miho (2018), exposure to Sinclair appears to
have increased the Republican vote share in Presidential elections.
3 Data and Measurement
This paper combines multiple data sources.
Station Sample. Our starting sample are 835 full-powered commercial TV stations that are affili-
ated to one of the big four networks (ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC). We focus on big-four affiliates
as they tend to take up most of the viewership in a media market and tend to be the ones pro-
ducing original newscasts.3 Information on the market served by each station and yearly network
affiliation 2010-2017 is from from BIA/Kelsey, an advisory firm focusing on the media industry.
3Local TV stations in the United States are usually affiliated to national networks, which are publishers that dis-
tribute branded content. Affiliated local TV stations, although under separate ownership, carry the television lineup
7
Sinclair Ownership and Control. Information on Sinclair control is from the group’s annual
reports to shareholders. In particular, we collect information on the date on which Sinclair took
control over the station’s programming. When the annual reports do not allow us to determine
the exact date of take-over, we recover this information from the BIA/Kelsey data, which include
the full transaction history of all stations in the sample.4 We consider stations to be controlled by
Sinclair if they are owned and operated by the Sinclair Broadcast Group, if they are owned and
operated by Cunningham Broadcasting, or if Sinclair controls the station’s programming through
a local marketing agreement.5 With a slight abuse of nomenclature, we use Sinclair acquisitions to
refer to Sinclair control determined by any of these instances, unless otherwise specified.6
Newscast Transcripts. To study how Sinclair acquisitions affect content, we use transcripts of
local TV newscasts from ShadowTV, a media monitoring company. For each station, we have the
closed caption transcripts of all evening newscasts (5-9pm) for a randomly selected day per week.
The data covers 323 (39%) stations in 112 media markets from 2010 to 2017, for a total of 291,323
newscasts. We segment each transcript into separate stories using an automated procedure based
on content similarity across sentences described in detail in Appendix A, which gives us 9.5m
separate stories.
We use the segmented transcripts data to measure whether a municipality appears in a crime story
in a station’s newscast. We identify crime stories about a municipality using the following proce-
dure:
1. We define a story to be local to a given municipality if the name of the municipality appears in
it. If multiple municipalities’ names appear in the same story, we define the story to be local
to all of them. For each station, we search the name of all municipalities with at least 10,000
inhabitants according to the 2010 Census that are located in the media market the station
belongs to. We exclude smaller municipalities as they are likely to receive a negligible share
of overall coverage.
offered by the network. 85% of local TV stations that produce their own newscasts are affiliated with one of the big
four networks (Papper, 2017).
4We use annual reports as our primary source because we are interested in Sinclair control in addition to ownership,
and the BIA/Kelsey data focus on outright ownership instead. In particular, the BIA/Kelsey data does not report
information on local marketing agreements under which Sinclair effectively controls programming of the station.
5Sinclair has a controlling interest in Cunningham Broadcasting, although it does not have a majority of voting
rights. The strong ties between Sinclair and Cunningham are also evidenced by the fact that as of the end of 2017, the
estate of Carolyn C. Smith owned all of the voting stock of the Cunningham Stations. She is the mother of the two
controlling shareholders of Sinclair. Under a local marketing agreement, Sinclair would control the programming of
the station.
6The large majority of stations under Sinclair control are owned and operated by Sinclair directly. Allowing for a
more comprehensive definition of control sets a different treatment date for around 10 stations out of the 121 that are
ever controlled by Sinclair (Appendix Table I, column (1)).
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2. We identify whether a story is about crime using a pattern-based sequence-classification
method. The method defines a story to be about crime if it contains a bigram that is much
more likely to appear in an external crime-related library, as opposed to a non crime-related
one, and is similar to the one used by Hassan et al. (2019) to identify firms’ exposure to
political risk from quarterly earnings calls.
The crime-related training library we consider are articles from the Metropolitan Desk of
the New York Times with the tags Crime Statistics, Criminal Offenses, or Law Enforcement
2010-2012, that we downloaded from Factiva. Instead, the non crime-related training library
is composed of all Metropolitan Desk articles without the same tags over the same period.
Each library is composed of all adjacent two word combinations (i.e. bigrams) contained in
the articles, as they tend to convey more information than single words. We remove punctua-
tion and stop words and lemmatize the remaining words using WordNet’s lemmatizer. We use
articles from the New York Times as they are a readily available, previously tagged corpus,
but focus on the Metropolitan Desk to capture on language that is appropriate to local news
stories.
We define a bigram to be about crime if it is ten times more likely to appear in the crime-
related library versus the non crime-related one. Focusing on the relatively frequency of
bigrams between the two libraries allows us to filter out common use bigrams (e.g. "New
York", "last year") that are likely to appear in the corpus but are not specific to crime. We
additionally filter out uncommonly used bigrams that might appear in the crime library only
because of noise by selecting bigrams that appear at least 50 times in the crime library. We
identify 179 crime bigrams following this procedure. Appendix Figure II shows word clouds
for the selected bigrams, where the size of the word is proportional to its relative frequency
(Panel (a)) or its overall frequency in the crime-related library (Panel (b)).7
3. We combine the definitions to create an indicator variable equal to 1 if a given municipality
was mentioned in a crime story in an evening newscast of a given station in a given week.
The analysis restricts the sample to stations continuously present in the content data from 2010
to 2017. In order to maximize sample size in the presence of short gaps in the data, we replace
missing observations in spells shorter than two consecutive months using linear interpolation. To
reduce measurement error, we drop municipalities whose name never appears in the transcript data
7We validate the procedure by comparing the classification of local stories (i.e. stories that mention at least one
of the municipalities with more than 10,000 people in the media market) that we obtain following this methodology
and a content characterization that results from training an unsupervised topic model on the same stories. First, going
back to Figure I, we can see that the share of local stories about crime that we identify with our methodology (22%) is
very similar to the overall weight of the crime topic (26%). Second, Appendix Figure III shows that the stories about
crime display significantly higher crime topic shares than non-crime stories. Overall, we determined that these results
indicate that the procedure we follow successfully identifies crime stories.
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(14 municipalities). The resulting sample includes 323 stations and 2201 municipalities.
Crime. Crime data are from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs) published by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation 2010-2017.8 UCRs are compiled from returns voluntarily submitted to the FBI
by police departments. They report monthly counts of offenses known to the police and counts of
offenses cleared for three property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft) and four
violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault).9 Given that many municipalities
only report their full-year crime and arrests counts, we aggregate the monthly agency data at the
year level. We use UCRs to study crime rates, defined as crimes per 1,000 people, and clearance
rates, defined as number of cleared crimes over total number of crimes.10
The sample is restricted to municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants that are located in
media markets part of the content data and with a municipal police department that reports crime
data to UCR. We further exclude municipalities that contract out law enforcement services to the
local sheriff’s office. Finally, we restrict the sample in the crime analysis to municipalities that
report at least one violent and one property crime in all years 2010-2017. The resulting sample
includes 1936 municipalities.
Municipality Characteristics. Municipality characteristics are from the 2006-2010 American
Community Survey (Manson et al., 2019). We construct the Republican vote share in the 2008
Presidential election aggregating precinct level returns at the municipal level. Precinct level re-
turns are from the Harvard Election Data archive (Ansolabehere et al., 2014). When precinct level
returns are not available (approximately 10% of the sample), we assign to the municipality the
share who voted Republican in the county the municipality is located in. County level returns are
from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2017).
Media Market Characteristics. Media market characteristics from 2010-2017 are from the Cen-
sus Bureau (demographics), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment), and the Bureau of
Economic Advisers (income per capita). Turnout and share Republican in Presidential elections
are from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2017). In all cases, we start from county level
data and aggregate them to the media market level.
Police Expenditures and Employment. Data on police departments’ employment are from the
8UCR data 2020-2016 are from NACJD 2017. UCR data for 2017 are from Kaplan (2019b).
9UCR data need extensive cleaning, as they are provided by the FBI without pre-processing. We clean the data
following the same procedure used in Mello (2019). In particular, the procedure identifies true missing or implausible
observations in the data and replaces them using linear interpolation.
10To define crime rates, we use a smoothed version of the population count included in the UCRs. A crime is consid-
ered cleared by arrest if at least one person has been arrested, charged, and turned over for prosecution (FBI website)
or if the offender has been identified, but external circumstances prevent an arrest. There is no perfect correspondence
between the crimes that are reported as being cleared in a certain year and the offenses taking place in that year, but the
vast majority of arrests happen close to the date of the incident. Using data at the yearly level minimizes the mismatch.
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UCR’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed in Action (LEOKA) files, which report the number of
sworn officers and civilian employees as of October of each year (Kaplan, 2019a). We supplement
these data with expenditures and employment from the Annual Survey of State and Local Gov-
ernment Finances and the Census of Governments 2010-2017, which are published by the Census
Bureau.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Appendix Table II columns (1) to (5) show descriptive statistics for the main variables consid-
ered in the analysis. Panel A shows that the average municipality was mentioned in 27% of the
newscasts in 2010, and appeared with a local crime story in 10% of them. Panel B reports the
average property and violent crime and clearance rates for the same year, and Panel C reports
socio-economic characteristics of these municipalities.
As we describe above, the sample is restricted to municipalities for which we have coverage in-
formation, which might raise concerns related to the external validity of our findings. However,
Appendix Figure IV shows that the content sample has good geographic coverage. In addition,
Appendix Table II columns (6) to (10) report descriptive statistics for all municipalities with more
than 10,000 inhabitants for comparison.11 The municipalities included in the analysis appear to be
highly comparable to other municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, as is confirmed by
the p-values reported in column (11).
4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy exploits the acquisition of local TV stations on part of the Sinclair Broadcast
Group as a shock to local news content. The shock to local news content induced by Sinclair is
twofold. First, when Sinclair acquires a station, newscasts tend to increase their national focus to
the detriment of original local content (effect #1). This is the treatment effect we are interested
in identifying. But in addition to this, Sinclair acquisitions also change the overall content of the
stations, in particular by transmitting more conservative content that might also be law enforcement
related (effect #2). For example, Sinclair is notorious for requiring its stations to air must-run
11The full sample includes 2849 municipalities; of these municipalities, 2584 have an independent police depart-
ment (i.e. a police department that does not depend on a sheriff’s office), report crime data to the UCR, and have at
least one violent and one property crime every year 2010-2017. We have coverage information for 2201 municipal-
ities, out of which 1936 are included in the crime sample as well. The sample for the content analysis includes 265
municipalities not in the crime analysis. We include them in order to maximize power, but show in the robustness
check section that this does not affect our results.
11
segments that include law and order features such as the "Terrorism Alert Desk," which provides
frequent updates on terrorism-related news (Newscast Studio, 2015).
In order to disentangle the two, we introduce a control group that is exposed to the overall content
change related to Sinclair acquisitions, but does not experience a change in its probability of being
mentioned in the news: same media market municipalities that are not likely to appear in the
news in the first place. The presence of this control group allows us to control for media market
trends and thus net effect #2 out. More precisely, we estimate a triple differences-in-differences
specification that combines variation across media markets and time from the staggered timing of
Sinclair acquisitions and within media market variation in whether municipalities are likely to be
covered in the news at baseline or not.
The intuition is the following. If Sinclair acquisitions decrease local news coverage, municipalities
often in the news at baseline would bear the brunt of the decline. Instead, municipalities that are
never in the news in the first place are not going to experience any change, and therefore function
as our control group. The identification assumption is that municipalities covered by local news
would have experienced the same change in police behavior after a Sinclair acquisition as non-
covered municipalities, were it not for the acquisition itself.
Appendix Figure V provides a visual intuition of the argument, based on the fact that crime report-
ing is principally a function of a municipality’s violent crime rate. The graphs are unconditional
binned scatter plots of the relationship between a municipality’s violent crime rate and the share
of weeks in which the same municipality is in the news with a local crime story in the same year,
before and after Sinclair acquisition. The sample is restricted to stations ever acquired by Sinclair.
Panel (a) shows the relationship for non-covered municipalities: the probability of being in the
news with a crime story is hovering around very low levels both before and after acquisition. In-
stead, for covered municipalities (panel (b)), higher violent crime rates are always correlated with a
higher probability of being in the news with a crime story, but for every level of violent crime, crime
reporting is lower after Sinclair acquires the station. We therefore use non-covered municipalities
as a control group that experiences the same media market shocks as covered municipalities, but
are not be directly affected by the decline in local coverage.
We define a municipality to be covered in the following way. First, we calculate the share of
weeks a municipality is mentioned in the news in our baseline year, 2010. If we have data for
multiple stations in the same media market, we assign to each municipality the median share of
weeks a municipality is mentioned in the news across the different stations. Finally, we define an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the municipality is in the news more then the median municipality in
2010, and 0 otherwise. As Appendix Figure VI shows, using data from media markets that never
experience Sinclair entry, the measure is persistent across years, showing that the likelihood of
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being in the news can be seen as a fixed characteristic of a municipality and mean reversion is
unlikely to explain our results.
Appendix Figure VII shows that covered and non-covered municipalities differ on a number of
characteristics. To ensure that the effect is not confounded by other municipality attributes but
is trult driven by exposure, our baseline specification includes interactions between Sinclair ac-
quisitions and baseline socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities. This implies that the
effect is going to be driven by those idiosyncratic traits other than the observable ones that make
one municipality more likely to be in the news than another. Given that covered and non-covered
municipalities are especially different in population size, we check whether our results survive
restricting the analysis to medium sized municipalities between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants.
Finally, it is important to note that the presence of a within-media market control group has the
additional advantage of allowing us to control for demographic or economic trends that might be
inducing Sinclair to enter some media markets before others. While Appendix Table III shows
no change in a media market’s socio-economic characteristics following Sinclair entry, the fact
that the design allows to control for trends in both observable and unobservable characteristics
strengthens the credibility of the results.
5 Effect of Sinclair Control on Reporting of Local Crime Sto-
ries
5.1 Specification
We estimate the effect of a Sinclair acquisition on the probability that covered municipalities are
mentioned in a crime story with respect to non-covered municipalities using the following baseline
specification:
ymst = βSinclairst ∗ Coveredm + Sinclairst ∗ X′m2010γ+ δst + δct + δms + emst (1)
where ymst is an indicator variable equal to 1 if municipality m was mentioned in a crime story
by station s in week t, Sinclairst is an indicator variable equal to 1 after a station is acquired by
Sinclair, Coveredm is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a municipality is likely to be in the news at
baseline, Xm2010 are baseline municipality characteristics, δst are station by week fixed effects, δct
are covered status by week fixed effects, and δsm are municipality by station fixed effects.12 Each
12In particular, Xm2010 includes the following variables: population, share male, share male between 15 and 30,
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municipality is associated with one media market, but there can be multiple stations that belong
to the media market covering the municipality. Given that the outcome is station and municipality
specific, the cross-sectional unit of interest is the municipality-station pair. We estimate the regres-
sion on a municipality-station pair by week panel that only includes municipality-station pairs that
belong to the same media market. The sample is restricted to 323 stations and 2201 municipalities
continuously reporting content data. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level.
The station by week fixed effects (δst) control non-parametrically for station specific trends in
content, in particular trends that might correlate with Sinclair control. Covered status by week
fixed effects (δct) allow us to take into account national trends experienced by different types of
municipalities, while municipality by station (δsm) fixed effects control for station specific level
differences across municipalities.
We provide evidence supporting the parallel trend assumption by estimating a version of the base-
line specification that allows the effect to vary over time, and we present event-study graphs that
plot leads and lags of the effect of Sinclair control on covered relative to non-covered municipali-
ties. In particular, we estimate the following specification:
ymst =
Tmin
∑
y=1
βy ∗ Pret−y,s ∗ Coveredm +
Tmax
∑
y=0
γy ∗ Postt+y,s ∗ Coveredm
+ δst + δct + δms + emdt
(2)
where variables are defined as above. To reduce noise, we constrain the effect to be constant by
year since treatment.
5.2 Main Results
Table I shows the effect of Sinclair acquiring a station on its local crime coverage of covered
versus non-covered municipalities. In particular, the table reports the coefficient on the interaction
between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and an indicator variable
for the municipality being covered at baseline, estimated from equation (1). We find that a Sinclair
acquisition decreases the probability that the station reports a local crime story about a covered
municipality by 2.4 percentage points with respect to a municipality that was not likely to be in
the news at baseline. The effect is significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the effect is large,
corresponding to almost 27% of the baseline mean.
share white, share over 55, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, median income, share of population below
the poverty rate, share unemployed, municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election.
Population, median income, and area are in logs.
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Covered and non-covered municipalities differ along a number of dimensions, most notably pop-
ulation. In column (2), we show that the effect is virtually unchanged by controlling for the inter-
action between Sinclair control and socio-economic characteristics of the municipality at baseline.
This confirms that the effect we are finding is indeed related to coverage, and not Sinclair control
having differential effects for, say, municipalities with a large population. To further improve the
comparability of the sample, in column (3), we additionally exclude municipalities with more than
50,000 inhabitants. The coefficient is smaller in size but similar in magnitude, corresponding to
29% of the baseline outcome mean of the restricted sample.
In our triple differences-in-differences design, identification rests on the assumption that, absent
treatment, the probability of covered municipalities being in the news with a local crime story
would have evolved similarly to the one of non-covered municipalities. We provide evidence sup-
porting the assumption by estimating an event-study specification that allows the effect of Sinclair
control to vary by time since treatment. Figure IV reports the βy and γy coefficient estimates from
equation (2), together with 95% confidence intervals. The figure shows no difference between
covered and non-covered municipalities in the three years leading up to the station coming under
Sinclair control. Stations under Sinclair control are less likely to report a local crime story about
covered municipalities than non-covered municipalities beginning in the first year after acquisition,
after which the effect slowly becomes larger over time.13
Other Types of Local News. In light of the results in Table I, it is natural to ask to what extent
the decline in local coverage is specific to crime news. In Appendix Table IV, we show that local
news does decrease across the board, but that the effect is larger for stories about crime. Column
(1) shows that Sinclair control lowers the probability that a station reports a local crime story about
covered municipalities with respect to non-covered municipalities by 3.8 percentage points (16%
of the baseline mean). However, column (2) and column (3) show that the effect is especially
strong for local crime stories with respect to non-crime local stories more generally. A possible
explanation for this is that producing crime news might be more expensive, for example because
reporters need to follow the story and often be at the crime location, than other local news such as
weather or sports, which can be produced without journalists being on the ground.
Overall Crime Coverage. How is non-local crime coverage affected by Sinclair acquisitions? We
address this question in Appendix Table V, where we estimate a difference-in-difference specifi-
cation at the station level.14 The main outcome is the share of stories that are about crime (column
(1)), which we further decompose in stories about crime that are local (column (2)) or not (column
13We can exploit our data to further explore the timing of the effect by estimating an event-study graph by semesters.
Appendix Figure VIII shows no effect in the first six months after treatment, after which the effect becomes negative
and of similar magnitude as the main effect. As is the case in the main event-study graph, the effect becomes larger in
magnitude over time.
14In particular, we regress the outcome on an indicator variable for the station being owned by Sinclair, media
15
(3)). The table shows a negative effect of Sinclair acquisitions on the overall share of stories about
crime, which is entirely explained by a decline in local crime stories. Importantly, coverage of
non-local crime stories does not appear to be affected by Sinclair: the control municipalities are
exposed to the same level of non-local crime news both before and after acquisition.15
Same-Media Market Stations. Our result might still reflect an underlying change in a munici-
pality’s crime prevalence or demand for crime stories. To shed light on this question, we replicate
our baseline model but focus our attention on the local crime coverage of stations that are in the
same media market as stations that are acquired by Sinclair, but that are not subject of the acquisi-
tion themselves. In Appendix Figure IX, we report the same βy and γy coefficient estimates from
equation (2), together with similarly defined leads and lags of Sinclair control but for same-media
market stations that are not directly controlled by Sinclair. In the two years leading up to Sinclair
entry, there is no difference in the reporting behavior of Sinclair and non-Sinclair stations. How-
ever, once Sinclair enters the media market, we do not see a decrease in local crime coverage for
non-Sinclair stations.
Table I column (4) confirms the result: a test of equality of the effect of Sinclair entry on Sinclair
and non-Sinclair stations shows that the effect is indeed statistically different (p-value = 0.038).
Taken together, the evidence supports the interpretation that decreasing local crime coverage is an
editorial decision on the part of Sinclair stations. This is not just reassuring but also interesting,
as it shows that other media groups are not responding to Sinclair changing content, at least as far
local crime coverage is concerned.
Heterogeneity by Political Leaning of the Municipality. Since Sinclair is a conservative media
outlet, we might worry that the decline in coverage could be influenced by political considerations.
To explore this possibility, in Appendix Table VI, we estimate the main specification separately
for municipalities with different political leanings. In particular, we split the sample by whether
the municipality’s Republican vote share was above the median (column (1)) or below the median
(column (2)) in the 2008 Presidential election. The coefficient is the same across the two sub-
samples (p-value=0.956), which suggests a limited scope for strategic coverage decisions based on
the political leaning of the municipalities.
Decomposing the Main Effect. Finally, to understand what variation is driving our main effect,
market characteristics measured in the 2010 Census interacted with week fixed effects, station fixed effects and week
fixed effects. The characteristics included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share white,
share Hispanic, and log income per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. A story is defined
to be about crime following the methodology explained in Section 3. A story is defined to be local if it directly refers
to one of the municipalities with at least 10,000 people in the media market.
15Given that Sinclair is a conservative media group, it might be surprising to not see an increase in the share of
non-local crime stories. However, the result has to be interpreted with caution as our methodology for identifying
crime stories is constructed focusing on local stories, and language from the Metropolitan Desk section of the New
York Times might not be suited to identify stories about, say, terrorism.
16
we estimate a differences-in-differences specification with heterogeneous effects in baseline mu-
nicipality exposure.16 Appendix Figure X shows that after Sinclair acquires a station, there is no
change in the probability that non-covered municipalities appear in the news with a crime story.
Instead, for covered municipalities, Sinclair entry implies a large decline in the probability of being
mentioned in the news with a crime story. Overall, decomposing the effect shows a pattern that
supports the intuition behind the triple differences-in-differences design: non-covered municipal-
ities do not experience a change in their local crime coverage, while covered municipalities bear
the brunt of the decline.
6 Effect of Sinclair Control on Police Behavior
6.1 How Should the Decline in Local Crime Coverage Influence Police?
In the previous section, we documented that when a local TV station is acquired by Sinclair, cov-
ered municipalities are less likely to appear in the news with a local crime story with respect
to non-covered municipalities. While from Sinclair’s point of view, cutting local coverage may
simply be a way to cut costs, this decline may have tangible implications. In particular, we are
interested in understanding the effect of the decline of local crime coverage on police behavior.
The outcome we study is clearance rates. Arrests are highly dependent on what actions are taken by
the police immediately after a crime takes place (Blanes i Vidal and Kirchmaier (2017), Cook et al.
(2019)), and as a result they are often used to study police behavior and effort (see, among others,
Mas (2006), Shi (2009), and Premkumar (2020)).
Importantly, not all crime types are equally likely to be the subject of local news. This is important
to the extent that we should expect arrest rates of different crimes to respond differently depending
on how important local news coverage is for them. We explore this heterogeneity in our content
16In particular, we estimate the following differences-in-differences specification with heterogeneous effects:
ymst = βSinclairst +
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∑
k=2
βkSinclairst ∗ CoveredQuantilekm +W ′dtη + δt ∗ X′m2010γ+ δsm + δt + emst (3)
where ymst is the share of weeks in month t in which municipality m was mentioned in a crime story by station s
in month t, Sinclairst is an indicator variable equal to 1 after a station is acquired by Sinclair, CoveredQuantilekm
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a municipality is in the k-th coverage quantile, Wdt are media market time-
varying controls, Xm2010 are baseline municipality characteristics, δt are month fixed effects, and δsm are municipality-
station pair fixed effects. Wdt includes population, share male, share male 15 to 30, share white, share Hispanic,
unemployment rate, and income per capita. Xm2010 includes the same variable as the main specification with the
addition of state fixed effects. The figure shows the β coefficient for the first quantile, and the linear combination of β
and βk for all other quantiles, together with 95% confidence intervals.
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data by developing a classifier model to identify whether local crime stories are about a violent
crime or a property crime, which we describe in detail in Appendix A. Figure V Panel (a) reports
the share of crime stories that are about violent crimes (i.e. murder, assault, rape, and robbery) and
the share of stories that are abour property crimes (i.e. burglary and theft). Local crime news has a
clear violent crime focus: 75% of local crime stories are about a violent crime, while only 16.7%
of crimes stories relate to a property crime.
The difference in reporting across crime types is even sharper if we consider the fact that violent
crimes are relatively rare, while property crimes are more common by orders of magnitude. As
shown in Figure V Panel (b), where we normalize the number of crime stories of a given type that
were reported about a municipality in 2010 by the number of offenses of the same type for the
same municipality, each violent crime is covered in approximately 0.16 stories. Instead, property
crimes, at 0.002 stories per offense, have a negligible probability of being covered in the news.
This evidence guides our analysis on police behavior. Given that property crimes appear to be
significantly less important than violent crimes for local news, we expect the decline in local crime
coverage to be less relevant for them: the main outcome of interest for our analysis is the violent
crime clearance rate.17
6.2 Specification
We estimate the relative effect of Sinclair entry on violent crime clearance rates of covered munic-
ipalities with respect to non-covered municipalities using the following baseline specification:
ymdt = βSinclairdt ∗ Coveredm + Sinclairdt ∗ X′m2010γ+ δdt + δct + δm + emdt (4)
where ymdt is the violent crime clearance rate in municipality m in media market d in year t,
Sinclairdt is an indicator variable equal to 1 after a media market experiences Sinclair entry,
Coveredm is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a municipality is likely to be in the news at baseline,
Xm2010 are municipality characteristics according to the 2010 Census, δdt are media market by year
fixed effects, δct are covered status by year fixed effects, and δm are municipality fixed effects.18
17We use our classifier model to also estimate the direct effect of Sinclair acquisitions on local coverage of violent
and of property crimes. Appendix Table VII shows that after Sinclair acquires a station, covered municipalities are
1.8 percentage points (27% of the baseline mean) less likely to appear in the news with a crime story about a violent
crime and 0.4 percentage points (30% of the baseline mean) less likely to appear in the news with a crime story about a
property crime. The effect is almost 4.5 larger for violent crimes than it is for property crimes, although the decline in
coverage is proportionally similar across crime type because of the substantially lower probability of property crimes
to appear in the news in the first place. As a result, we expect the decline in coverage to be less consequential for
property crimes rather than for violent crimes, which confirms the interpretation proposed in the main text.
18Because of restrictions on ownership imposed by the Federal Communications Commission, each owner generally
controls one station by media market. Acquiring a new station usually implies entering a new media market.
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The regression is estimated on a balanced municipality by year panel 2010-2017. Standard errors
are clustered at the media market level.
The media market by year fixed effects (δdt) control non-parametrically for the overall change
in content that is associated with Sinclair entering a media market such as the likely increase in
conservative slant. In addition, they allow us to take into account media market specific trends in
demographics that might correlate with Sinclair entry. Covered status by year fixed effects (δct)
allow covered and non-covered municipalities to be affected by different shocks over time, while
municipalities fixed effects (δm) allow for level differences across municipalities.19
We consider a media market to be treated in a given year if Sinclair owns one of the media market’s
stations in January of that year. This implies that the year of treatment is the first year in which
Sinclair is present in the media market the entire time. This decision is justified by the fact that
87% of the stations in our sample are acquired by Sinclair in the second half of the year (58% in the
last trimester), which means that partially treated years only see a Sinclair presence for a couple of
months. Nonetheless, we ensure that the results are robust to this decisions in the robustness check
section.
As before, we also estimate an event-study specification that allows the relative effect of Sinclair
entry to vary over time. In particular, we estimate the following specification:
ymdt =
Tmin
∑
y=1
βy ∗ Pret−y,d ∗ Coveredm +
Tmax
∑
y=0
γy ∗ Postt+y,d ∗ Coveredm
+ δdt + δct + δm + emdt
(5)
where all variables are defined as above.
6.3 Main Results
Table II shows the effect of Sinclair entry in a media market on the violent crime clearance rate
of covered versus non-covered municipalities. The table reports the coefficient on the interaction
between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable
for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, estimated from the baseline specification out-
lined in equation (4). Column (1) shows that after Sinclair enters a media market, the violent crime
clearance rate is 4.2 percentage points lower in covered than in non-covered municipalities. The
effect is significant at 1% level, and it is sizable in economic magnitude, corresponding to 8% of
19Given that each municipality is associated with one media market, the inclusion of municipality fixed effects
makes controlling for covered status by media market fixed effects, as is customary in triple differences-in-differences
specification, redundant.
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the baseline mean. As before, controlling for the interaction between an indicator for Sinclair’s
entrance in the media market and socio-economic characteristics of the municipality does not af-
fect the results (column (2)), and neither does restricting the sample to municipalities with fewer
than 50,000 inhabitants (column (3)). Importantly, controlling for crime rates and population, two
factors that we might worry influence violent crime clearance rates but that we do not include in
the main specification because they are potentially endogenous to the treatment, does not change
the result (column (4)).
We provide evidence supporting the identifying assumption of parallel trends between covered
and non-covered municipalities by estimating an event-study specification that allows the effect
of Sinclair entry in a media market to vary by time since treatment. Figure VI reports the βy and
γy coefficient estimates from equation (5), together with 95% confidence intervals. The figure
shows no difference between covered and non-covered municipalities in the two years leading up
to Sinclair’s entrance in the media market. The effect is then fully realized in the first year after
the acquisition, but the gap between covered and non covered municipalities seems to be shrinking
over time.
While the overall pattern displayed by the event study graph is supportive of the identification
assumption, we might be worried about the positive coefficient at t − 3 suggesting pre-existing
differences between covered and non-covered municipalities. To convince ourselves that this is
not the case and to also better understand the time pattern of the effect, we estimate an event-study
graph aggregating monthly data at the semester rather than year level.20 Appendix Figure XI shows
the resulting event-study graph. While the estimates are substantially noisier than for the yearly
data, the graph confirms that there is no difference between covered and non-covered municipalities
in the three years leading up to treatment, which we find reassuring. In addition, there is no effect
in the first six months after treatment, after which the coefficient becomes negative (six to twelve
months after treatment). Over time, the magnitude of the effect starts shrinking, with the gap
between covered and non-covered municipalities almost disappearing three years after Sinclair
enters the media market.
Heterogeneity of the Effect by Type of Crime. Not all violent crimes are the same. As a conse-
quence, it is natural to explore the effect of Sinclair entry on the clearance rate of different types of
violent crime. This is what we show in Table III. Column (1) reports the main effect for reference,
and columns (2) to (5) present the effect, looking separately at the clearance rates of murders,
20As mentioned in the data section, our preferred specification is to aggregate the monthly data at the yearly level
because many municipalities only report full-year totals, and as a result, specifications that require monthly data are
estimated on a smaller sample. In addition, the requirement of the municipality reporting at least one violent crime for
every time period is also more stringent for data at a finer temporal level. Taken together, these limitations imply that
the event study graph by semesters is estimated on a more selected sample of 1387 instead of 1620 municipalities.
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assaults, robberies, and rapes. The results reported in Panel A are based on the full sample, but
to avoid the results being driven by the sample being unbalanced, Panel B reports estimates for a
balanced sample of municipalities for each type of crime. The table shows that the decline in the
violent crime clearance rate is not only driven by a decline in the clearance rate of murders, but
also appears in the clearance rates of assaults, robberies and rapes. Because of data limitations,
we cannot draw strong conclusions on what is happening to the murder clearance rate; however, it
is suggestive that we are seeing an effect on crimes that are especially likely to be affected by the
decline in coverage.
Property Crime Clearance Rates. As discussed in section 6.1, given that local crime news have
a clear violent focus, we should expect limited effects on property crime clearance rates. Table IV
shows that the property crime clearance rate is not differentially affected by Sinclair acquisitions
in covered as opposed to non-covered municipalities. This is consistent with the idea that property
crimes should be minimally impacted by the change in content, given that they have a very low
baseline probability of appearing in the news in the first place.
Crime Rates. A potential concern is that the change in the violent crime clearance rate might
be explained by an increase in the violent crime rate, and not by a response of police officers
to the changing media environment. Appendix Table VIII suggests that this is not the case. The
table reports the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime rate of covered municipalities relative
to non-covered municipalities, for all violent crimes (column (1)) and separately by type of crime
(column (2) to column (5)). Panel A reports the effect on crime rates in levels, while panel B defines
as the outcome as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the municipality reported at least one crime
of the specified type. Reassuringly, we do not find any statistically significant difference in the
violent crime rate of covered and non-covered municipalities after Sinclair enters a media market.
Even if we take the positive coefficient on the violent crime rate at face value, the magnitude of
the effect (2.8% of the baseline mean) is too small to fully explain the decline in the violent crime
clearance rate.
Appendix Table IX looks instead at property crime rates. Column (1) shows that Sinclair entry is
associated with 1.195 higher property crime rate (3.5% of the baseline mean) in covered munic-
ipalities relative to non-covered ones. The effect is marginally significant at the 10% level, and
seems to be mostly driven by burglaries (column (2)). This result is potentially consistent with an
incapacitation effect due to the lower clearance rates, or criminals factoring in lower deterrence for
the same reason. In addition, the positive effect on property crime rates might be due to a reduction
in overall police performance in treated municipalities, which would be consistent with a reduction
in monitoring and scrutiny induced by lower crime news coverage. An alternative explanation is
that individuals who commit property crimes are directly affected by the decline in crime content
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of local news (see Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) and Lindo et al. (2019)). Given that the local news
audience tends to be female and above 55, we believe that this explanation has a limited role to
play in this setting.
Municipal Police Spending. It is possible for the effect to be explained by covered municipal-
ities having lower police spending as opposed to non-covered municipalities after Sinclair entry.
Appendix Table X shows that after Sinclair entry, covered and non-covered municipalities have
similar police expenditures and employment per capita. The only measure that appears to be
differentially affected are judicial expenditures per capita (column (2)). Given that judicial expen-
ditures include all arrests related costs, this is consistent with the main result on the violent crime
clearance rate.
Police Violence. We might wonder whether the decrease of news coverage of local crime also af-
fects the probability that officers are involved in episodes of police violence. In Appendix Table XI
we address this question using data from Fatal Encounters (FE), the most comprehensive dataset
of police-involved fatalities.21 We find no evidence supporting the idea of news coverage of crime
stories influencing police violence. The large confidence intervals suggest in particular that, given
that officer-involved fatalities are rare events, we might not have sufficient power to detect an
effect.
Heterogeneity. What municipalities are driving the result? We address this question by looking at
the heterogeneity of the effect on the violent crime clearance rate by different municipality char-
acteristics. In particular, we estimate the baseline specification splitting the sample by whether
municipalities are above or below the median for the characteristic being considered. We focus on
characteristics that are salient for policing, such as share white or share Hispanic, and on charac-
teristics that might be related to crime, such as income and unemployment. We report the results
of this exercise in Appendix Figure XI. Panel (b) shows the estimates for violence clearance rate.
Overall, the main effect on the violent crime clearance rate seems to quite consistent across differ-
ent municipalities. However, the decrease in the violent crime clearance rate appears to be larger
in municipalities with a higher minority share. Crucially, this is not explained by heterogeneous
declines in crime coverage: Appendix Figure XI panel (a) shows that Sinclair cuts local cover-
age equally for all municipalities. Decomposing the Main Effect. Finally, to understand what
variation is behind the main effect, we estimate a differences-in-differences specification with het-
21Fatal Encounters is a crowdsourced dataset that aims to document all deaths in the U.S. where police is present or
involved. Given that a precise classification of incident types (e.g. incident involving intentional use of deadly force)
is still being developed at present, we do not differentiate across different types of incidents here. While the data is
notoriously challenging to collect and verify, FE aims to provide a comprehensive account of these incidents through
"Freedom of Information Act requests to police departments, web-scraping of news sources, paid researchers to run
additional searches and data checks from public sources, and aggregation from multiple other sources" Premkumar
(2020).
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erogeneous effects in baseline municipality exposure.22 Appendix Figure XIII shows that after
Sinclair enters a media market, non-covered municipalities experience an increase in their vio-
lent crime clearance rate. This might be explained by media market level trends correlated with
Sinclair acquisitions, or it could be a direct effect of Sinclair entry, which is not necessarily surpris-
ing, since, as we previously discussed, Sinclair is a conservative media outlet, which might build
support for tough on crime policies. Instead, covered municipalities do not experience a change
in the violent crime clearance rate when compared to other covered municipalities. The overall
negative coefficient in the triple difference-in-difference specification is therefore explained by a
differential effect of Sinclair across covered and non-covered municipalities, in which had there
not been a decline in the probability of being in the news, the violent crime clearance rate would
have increased. Instead, the decline in crime coverage that is specific to covered municipalities
fully undoes the effect.
7 Robustness Checks
In this section, we show that our results are robust to a number of potential concerns. To avoid
repetitions, we discuss the robustness of our two main sets of results together in this section.
Appendix Table XII and Appendix Table XIII show the robustness of the effect of Sinclair own-
ership on local crime coverage, while Appendix Table XIV and Appendix Table XV show the ro-
bustness of the effect of Sinclair on the violent crime clearance rate.
Robustness to Outcome Variable Definition. We begin by showing that the precise way in which
we identify crime stories does not matter for the main result. In particular, Appendix Table XII
column (1) shows that selecting crime stories based on the presence of bigrams that are five (as
opposed to ten) times more likely to appear in the crime-related library versus the non crime-related
library leaves the result virtually unchanged. The same is true for when we use bigrams that are
more distinctively about crime, i.e. bigrams that are twenty times more likely to appear in the
22We estimate the following differences-in-differences specification with heterogeneous effects:
ymdt = βSinclairdt +
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∑
k=2
βkSinclairdt ∗ CoveredQuantilekm +W ′dtη + δt ∗ X′m2010γ+ δm + δt + emdt (6)
where ymdt is the violent crime clearance rate of municipality m in year t, Sinclairdt is an indicator variable equal to 1
after Sinclair enters the media market, CoveredQuantilekm is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a municipality is in the
k-th coverage quantile, Wdt are media market time-varying controls, Xm2010 are baseline municipality characteristics,
δt are year fixed effects, and δmm are municipality fixed effects. Wdt includes population, share male, share male 15
to 30, share white, share Hispanic, unemployment rate, and income per capita. Xm2010 includes the same variable as
the main specification with the addition of state fixed effects. The figure shows the β coefficient for the first quantile,
and the linear combination of β and βk for all other quantiles, together with 95% confidence intervals.
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crime-related library versus the non crime-related library (column (2)). In addition, the main effect
is unchanged when we segment newscasts into stories using a fixed number of tokens for each
story (column (3)). Appendix Table XIV columns (1) and (2) show that the results are unchanged
in we use respectively unadjusted or non-winsorised violent crime clearance rates.
Robustness to Sample Restrictions. Appendix Table XII column (4) shows that the main effect
on content is unchanged by restricting the sample to municipalities that report crime data to the
UCR and have at least one violent and one property crime every year 2010-2017.
Robustness to Definition of Sinclair Control. In the baseline analysis, we consider a station to
be controlled by Sinclair in all months after acquisition, independently on whether Sinclair retains
control of the station in a given media market or not. In Appendix Table XII column (5) and
Appendix Table XIV column (3), we show that dropping the three stations that were divested by
Sinclair in the 2010 to 2017 period does not make a difference.
Next, we consider whether focusing on stations that were directly owned and operated by Sin-
clair impacts our result. Column (6) of Appendix Table XII shows no difference in the result if
we focus on stations over which Sinclair had tighter control. The same is true in column (4) of
Appendix Table XIV.
In addition, Appendix Table XII column (7) and Appendix Table XIV column (5) show that the
main results are unchanged when we only include markets that were entered by Sinclair as part of
multi-station deals. This is reassuring to the extent that we might be less concerned of endogenous
entry of Sinclair when the station is acquired as part of a deal to acquire multiple stations, as
opposed a single one.
Finally, we show in Appendix Table XII column (6) that the main effect on clearance rates is
robust to considering a media market to be treated in a given year if Sinclair owns one of the media
market’s stations in December of that year, i.e. if a partially treated year is considered to be treated.
Robustness to Staggered Timing. Recent developments in the differences-in-differences litera-
ture have highlighted that when these designs exploit the staggered timing of treatment, the es-
timate recovered is a weighted average of underlying two-by-two differences-in-differences esti-
mates (Goodman-Bacon, 2019). This is potentially problematic given that weights can be negative,
which means that even if all underlying two-by-two effects are positive, they might be aggre-
gated to a negative coefficient in the estimation. No formal extension to these concepts to triple
differences-in-differences exists at the moment. Nonetheless, we believe the issue to be limited in
this case because negative weights arise from using earlier treated units as control for later treated
units. Instead, in our setting, we have many never treated and always treated stations, which sug-
gests that most of the weight is going to come from these types of comparisons.
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Nonetheless, in Appendix Table XIII and in Appendix Table XV, we present results when we re-
peat the estimates artificially eliminating staggered timing. In particular, in the regressions re-
ported in Appendix Table XIII, we include only stations that are never treated, stations that are
always treated, and stations that are acquired at four separate points in time corresponding to the
acquisition of smaller broadcast groups. Out of the four moments in time we consider, three repro-
duce a negative and significant coefficient. The magnitude of the effect is larger in two of them,
but larger standard errors produce confidence intervals consistent with the main point estimate. If
we focus on stations acquired from Barrington in November 2013 only, we find a negative effect
that is similar in magnitude, but is not statistically significant. In Appendix Table XV, we restrict
the sample to media markets that were never exposed to Sinclair, media markets that were always
exposed to Sinclair, and media markets that were acquired by Sinclair in the year specified in the
column header. We only perform a separate estimation for years in which Sinclair entered of more
than three media markets. In all years but 2015, we find a negative coefficient (significant in two
out of three specifications).
8 Mechanisms
Why does the decline in local crime coverage affect clearance rates? The mechanism that we put
forward is that when stories about a municipality’s violent crimes are less likely to appear in local
news, crime becomes less salient in the eyes of local citizens. As a result, the pressure that these
citizens put on the local police to clear these violent crimes decreases, inducing police officers
to alter their effort allocation away from clearing violent crimes in favor of other policing related
activities.23 In this section, we provide three pieces of evidence supporting this mechanism but
also discuss alternative explanations such as direct media monitoring and community cooperation.
Salience of Crime and Police. To support the idea that the decline in crime content impacts
perceptions, we investigate whether general interest about crime and police activities changes after
Sinclair acquisitions. Ideally, we would want to test the effect of Sinclair on crime and police
perceptions directly. Implementing our empirical strategy requires highly localized but nationally
representative data on perceptions over time, which is not available to the best of our knowledge.
For example, most surveys specifically about crime perceptions (e.g. Gallup Poll Social Series)
have a limited sample; instead, general surveys such as the Cooperative Congressional Election
Study only ask about crime and law enforcement in a few waves and often change the specific
question asked.
23It is important to note that we are not able to draw welfare conclusion from our analysis, as it is unclear what
the optimal arrest rate looks like. According to theories of “de-policing” (Owens, 2019), it is possible that decreasing
arrest rates might be socially optimal.
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We address this issue by using using data on Google searches as a proxy for overall interest in the
topic. In particular, we collect data on monthly Google searches containing the terms "crime" and
"police".24 Because the Google trends data are not consistently available below the media market
level, we run a difference-in-differences model exploiting the staggered entry of Sinclair across
media markets.25 The outcome variable is the monthly volume of searches, and it is expressed in
logarithm. The sample is restricted to media markets for which the volume searches for crime and
police are never censored.
Table V reports the findings of our analysis. The estimates show that when Sinclair enters a media
market, the volume of monthly searches containing the keywords crime and police decreases by
4%. The effect is not explained by an overall and generalized decline in searches, as shown by
the placebo regressions looking at monthly searches for popular keywords such as "weather" and
"youtube". These results suggest that the decrease in local crime stories triggers a change in public
interest for precisely those topics that are now less present in the local news. Importantly, this
goes in the opposite direction as one would expect based on actual crime rates that are, if anything,
higher after Sinclair enters a media market.
Changes in House Prices Suggestive of Decreased Concern of Crime. To further investigate
whether a decrease in local crime coverage affects public opinion, we turn our attention to house
prices and rents. In a hedonic model of house prices, crime rates and crime perceptions are ameni-
ties that are reflected in house prices by market mechanisms: we can use these prices as a proxy for
crime perceptions. Data on monthly municipality-level house prices and rents are from Zillow.26
We estimate an event-study specification similar to the one in equation (5). Given that house prices
and rents are likely to reflect local level conditions and crime levels, we additionally interact base-
line municipality characteristics with year dummies, and also control for the monthly violent crime
rate and the property crime rate. Appendix Figure XIV reports the coefficient estimates from the
event study specification. The figures show some suggestive but imprecisely estimated evidence of
house prices and rents being higher in covered relative to non-covered municipalities after Sinclair
24The Google Trends API normalizes the search interest between 0 and 100 for the time and location of each query.
In particular, "each data point is divided by the total searches of the geography and time range it represents to compare
relative popularity. [...] The resulting numbers are then scaled on a range of 0 to 100 based on a topic’s proportion
to all searches on all topics" (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). Importantly, the Google trends API limits the number
of geographic location per query to five. We ensure comparability across media markets and time by including the
New York media market in all our queries, and normalizing search volume to the one of New York media market
following Müller and Schwarz (2019) and Goldsmith-Pinkham and Sojourner (2020). We modify the script provided
by Goldsmith-Pinkham and Sojourner (2020) to query the Google trends API.
25The Google trends API censors observations that are a below a unknown threshold. Monthly Google trends data by
municipality are censored with a very high frequency, which makes it impossible to construct a panel of municipalities
over time.
26In particular, we use the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) and the Zillow Rent Index (ZRI), which provide
municipality level monthly estimates of market rate home values prices and rental prices, expressed in logarithms.
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enters a media market.
Electoral Feedback. Perceptions become reality when it is election time. If the change in local
news coverage makes crime less salient, this will be reflected in political participation and voting
choices. Unfortunately, there exists no data on political platforms at the local level that would
allow us to test this hypothesis directly, but we believe this feedback mechanism to be particularly
credible in the setting given that the individuals whose opinion is likely to be influenced by the
treatment are exactly the ones whose opinions are likely to matter for local politics: those over
55.27
Appendix Figure XI shows descriptive evidence supporting this statement. Using the 2010 Co-
operative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere, 2012), we show that individuals over 55
are 25% more likely to watch local TV news and 50% more likely to attend local political meet-
ings with respect to younger individuals. This is important to the extent that it highlights how
perceptions of specific crime issues might be reflected in police behavior through public opinion
pressure in the absence of elections. In addition, Goldstein (2019) shows that this age group is also
especially concerned with crime and policing. Consistent with this argument, Table VI shows that
the effect on the violent crime clearance rate appears to be driven by cities with a larger share of
population above 55 years old (p-value = 0.20), even though the change in content is exactly the
same across the two groups of municipalities. While the difference in the effect is not statistically
significant, we interpret this as suggestive evidence that a change in public opinion might be behind
the main effect on clearance rates.
Direct Media Monitoring. An alternative mechanism is that there could be a decrease in the direct
media monitoring of the police. If police officers anticipate a low probability of being reported in
the news for failing to solve crimes, they might shirk on the amount of effort allocated to this
activity. To explore whether this is likely to be the case, we use our content data to separately
identify stories about crime incidents and about arrests. In particular, we define stories to be about
arrests if they contain crime bigrams related to arrests or prosecutions (e.g. "police arrested" or
"murder charge") or include the string "arrest" (this would also capture words such as "arrested",
"arrests"); all other stories are about crime.
In Table VII, we separately report the effect of a Sinclair acquisition on the relative probability that
covered and non-covered municipalities appear in the news with different types of crime stories.
The decline in crime reporting appears to be almost entirely driven by stories about crime incidents
(column (1)), whereas stories about arrests experience a much smaller decline, which is also not
27While the extent to which police officers are influenced by politics and the public is debated, recent research has
highlighted that managerial directives can have important effects on police behavior, supporting the idea that public
opinion might influence the effort allocation of the officers (Ba and Rivera, 2019; Goldstein et al., 2020; Mummolo,
2018).
27
statistically significant (column (2)). These results do not support direct media monitoring through
stories about police clearances being the main explanation for the results, although we cannot
exclude the possibility the police officers are updating their overall probability of being the subject
of reporting based on the overall decline in crime coverage.
Community Cooperation. Finally, it is also possible for the effect on clearance rates to be driven
by decreased community cooperation with the police. Community cooperation is generally con-
sidered to be important for successful policing and crime investigations, and it has been shown to
be negatively affected after high-profile cases of police misconduct (Desmond et al., 2016). It is
unclear why the change in content that we document should have direct negative effects on the
public’s perception of the police: if anything, people are seeing fewer stories about crimes and
similar stories about arrests, so they should perceive the police to be equally effective.28
Having said this, we might still worry that independently of what the public thinks of the police,
people might be less likely to spontaneously provide useful information to solve crimes if they do
not hear about the crime incidents on TV. Unfortunately, there is limited data on the importance
of tips to solve crimes, but our understanding is that the phenomenon is quantitatively limited. A
piece of evidence that supports this interpretation comes from the evaluation of a tip solicitation
program, Crimestoppers, that uses data for the year 2000 in the United Kingdom. According to this
rare evaluation of the program, only 11% of calls resulted in actionable intelligence; in addition,
most calls are for minor offenses such as drug crimes that are not included in our analysis, and
overall only "30 calls were received which led to an arrest or change in relation to murder, 25 in
relation to attempted murder, and 28 in relation to sexual assault" (Gresham et al., 2003). Overall,
while we cannot exclude this alternative story, we believe that it would only be able to explain a
small fraction of the effect.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effect of a shock in local news content on a prototypical local bureau-
cracy: municipal police departments in the U.S.. The source of variation in local news content that
we exploit is the acquisition of local TV stations by the Sinclair Broadcast Group. In particular, our
empirical strategy combines variation in the timing of acquisitions with cross-sectional variation
in exposure to the local news shock in a triple differences-in-difference design.
First, we document that when a station is acquired by Sinclair, covered municipalities experience a
decline in the probability of appearing in the news with a crime story with respect to non-covered
28Instead, we would interpret a change in the effectiveness of the police coming from the relative decline in clearance
rates to be downstream from the effect on police effort, and we do not see it as a threat to our interpretation.
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municipalities. We do so by exploiting a unique dataset of transcripts of local TV newscasts of
323 stations from 2010-2017. We find a very significant and sizable effect: relative to non-covered
municipalities, covered municipalities exhibit a reduction in the probability of appearing in the
news with a crime story of about 27% of the outcome mean in 2010.
How does police behavior change in response to the change in local news content? We answer this
question by studying clearance rates. We find that after Sinclair enters a media market, covered
municipalities exhibit lower violent crime clearance rates with respect to non-covered municipali-
ties. The effect is significant at the 1% level and corresponds to a decrease to 8% of the baseline
mean. Instead, we do not find any effect for property crime clearance rates, which is consistent
with local TV news having a violent crime focus.
To explain these results, we argue that, when violent crime is less salient in the news, police offi-
cers alter their effort allocation away from clearing violent crimes in favor of other police activities
because of an overall decrease in crime salience. To support this interpretation, we provide evi-
dence that, when Sinclair enters a media market, the salience of crime and police becomes lower.
Moreover, we document that our results are stronger in municipalities with a higher share of indi-
viduals above 55 years old, which we show are both those more exposed to local TV news and an
important interest group for local politics.
This paper shows that shocks to local media content driven by acquisitions can affect the behavior
of the police. Overall, this suggests that the increase in ownership concentration currently char-
acterizing the local TV market in the United States might have important consequences for local
institutions.
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Figure I: Local TV News Content
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(b) Local News Topics
Notes: This figure describes local TV news content. Panel (a) shows the share of stories that are local, that are about crime, and both local and
about crime. A story is local if it mentions at least one of the municipalities with more than 10,000 people in the media market. A story is about
crime if it contains a "crime bigram" (i.e. a bigram that is much more likely to appear in crime-related stories than in non-crime related ones of the
Metropolitan Desk Section of the New York Times). For more details, see Section 3. Panel (b) shows the mean topic share from an unsupervised
LDA topic model trained on local stories. In both graphs, the sample is restricted to media markets that never experienced Sinclair entry.
Figure II: Number of Stations Controlled by Sinclair 2010-2017
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Notes: This figure shows the number of big-four affiliate stations controlled by Sinclair in each month from January 2010 to December 2017. A
station is considered controlled by Sinclair if it is owned and operated by the Sinclair Broadcast Group, if it is owned and operated by Cunningham
Broadcasting, or if Sinclair controls programming through a local marketing agreement.
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Figure III: Map of Media Markets Experiencing Sinclair Entry 2010-2017
Notes: This map shows year of Sinclair entry across media markets in the United States. Darker colors correspond to later entry. Never treated
are media markets that never experience Sinclair entry; always treated are media markets that have at least one station controlled by Sinclair at the
beginning of the period of interest (January 2010). There were no additional stations that were acquired in 2010.
Figure IV: Effect of Sinclair Control on the Probability of Having a Local Crime Story, by Year
since Treatment
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of Sinclair control on the probability that a station reports local crime stories about covered municipalities
relative to non-covered municipalities, by year since treatment. We report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of
an indicator variable for the station reporting a local crime story about the municipality on the interaction between indicator variables for years since
Sinclair control and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, station by week fixed effects, covered status by week
fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (2)). The omitted category is T-1. Standard errors are clustered at the media market
level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in each media market covering the same municipalities,
and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment is defined at the monthly level, but the effect is constrained to be
the same by year since treatment.
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Figure V: Local Crime News of Violent and Property Crimes
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(b) Crime Stories per Offense
Notes: This figure shows what crimes are covered in local TV news. Panel (a) shows the average share of a municipality’s crime stories that are
about violent crimes (i.e. murder, assault, rape, and robbery) and property crimes (i.e. burglary and theft). Panel (b) shows the average number of
crime stories per reported offense across municipalities. In both graphs, the sample is restricted to 2010 and to media market that never experience
Sinclair entry.
Figure VI: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Violent Crime Clearance Rate, by Year since Treatment
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered munici-
palities, by year since treatment. We report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of the municipality’s violent crime
clearance rate on the interaction between indicator variables for years since Sinclair entry and an indicator variable for whether the municipality
is covered at baseline, media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (5)). The
omitted category is T-1. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined
at the yearly level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. Clearance
rates are defined as total number of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means over total number of crimes.
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Tables
Table I: Effect of Sinclair Control on the Probability of Having a Local Crime Story
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sinclair * Covered -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
-0.005
(0.005)
Observations 3065194 3065194 2334112 3065194
Clusters 112 112 109 112
Municipalities 2201 2201 1673 2201
Stations 323 323 319 323
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.089 0.089 0.048 0.089
P-value Sinclair = Other .038
Station by Week FE X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X
Station by Municipality FE X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X
Restricts Sample 10k-50k X
Had Local Crime Story
Non-Sinclair Stations in Sinclair 
Media Market * Covered
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair control on the probability that a station reports local crime stories about covered municipalities
relative to non-covered municipalities. We regress an indicator variable for the station reporting a local crime story about the municipality on the
interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered
at baseline, station by week fixed effects, covered status by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects. Column (2) additionally
includes the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and baseline municipality characteristics (equation
(1)). The characteristics included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share
with 2 years of college, log median income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican
vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Column (3) restricts the sample to municipalities with fewer than 50,000 people. Finally, column (4)
also includes the interaction between an indicator variable for being in the same media market as a station under Sinclair control and an indicator
variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline. The p-value reported in column (4) is from a test of the difference between the effect
of Sinclair entry on the station controlled by Sinclair and other stations in the same media market. Standard errors are clustered at the media market
level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in each media market covering the same municipalities,
and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment is defined at the monthly level.
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Table II: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Violent Crime Clearance Rate
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sinclair * Covered -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.037** -0.036***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014)
Observations 15488 15488 11680 15488
Clusters 112 112 108 112
Municipalies 1936 1936 1460 1936
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.467 0.467 0.472 0.467
Media Market by Week FE X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X
Restricts Sample 10k-50k X
Controls for Crime Rates and Population X
Violent Crime Clearance Rate
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipal-
ities. We regress the municipality’s violent crime clearance rate on the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media
market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year
fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects. Column (2) additionally includes the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence
in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics (equation (4)). The characteristics included are log population, share male, share
male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of population below
the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Column (3) restricts the
sample to municipalities with fewer than 50,000 people. Column (4) additionally controls for the property crime rate, the violent crime rate, and
log population. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the
yearly level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. Clearance rates
are defined as total number of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means over total number of crimes. Crimes rates are crimes per 1,000 people.
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Table III: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Violent Crime Clearance Rate, by Type of Crime
Dependent Variable
Violent 
Crime 
Clearance 
Rate
Murder Assault Robbery Rape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sinclair * Covered -0.038*** 0.072 -0.014 -0.063** -0.052**
(0.013) (0.088) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 15488 7723 14016 15045 14572
Clusters 112 111 111 112 112
Municipalities 1936 1479 1760 1931 1920
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.467 0.694 0.600 0.346 0.392
Sinclair * Covered -0.026* - -0.012 -0.037 -0.022
(0.013) - (0.017) (0.033) (0.031)
Observations 11216 - 11216 11216 11216
Clusters 111 - 111 111 111
Municipalities 1402 - 1402 1402 1402
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.503 - 0.591 0.374 0.424
Media Market by Week FE X X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X X X
By Type of Crime
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: Balanced Sample
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipal-
ities, for different types of violent crimes. We regress the municipality’s clearance rate for a given type of violent crime on the interaction between
between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline,
the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics, media market by
year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). The characteristics included are log population,
share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of
population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Standard
errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market
is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. Panel A includes the full sample; panel B
restricts the sample to municipalities that experience at least one assault, one robbery, and one rape in every year. Clearance rates are defined as
total number of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means over total number of crimes.
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Table IV: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Property Crime Clearance Rate, by Type of Crime
Dependent Variable
Property 
Crime 
Clearance 
Rate
Burglary Theft
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sinclair * Covered -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Observations 15488 15472 15486 15422
Clusters 112 112 112 112
Municipalities 1936 1936 1936 1935
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.198 0.135 0.218 0.179
Media Market by Week FE X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X X
By Type of Crime
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the property crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered munic-
ipalities, overall and for different types of property crimes. We regress the municipality’s clearance rate for a given type of property crime on the
interaction between between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is
covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics,
media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). The characteristics included
are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median
income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential
election. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly
level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. Clearance rates are
defined as total number of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means over total number of crimes.
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Table V: Effect of Sinclair Entry on Salience of Crime and Police
Dependent Variable
Keyword Crime Police Weather Youtube
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sinclair -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.009 -0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009)
Observations 14880 14880 14880 14880
Clusters 155 155 155 155
Outcome Mean in 2010 3.624 3.920 3.872 4.284
Media Market FE X X X X
Month FE X X X X
Media Market Controls X X X X
Monthly Search Volume
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the salience of crime and police using Google trend data in differences-in-differences design.
We regress the search volume for "crime" (column (1)), "police" (column (2)), "weather" (column (3)) and "youtube" (column (4)) on an indicator
variable for Sinclair presence in the media market, baseline media market characteristics interacted with month fixed effects, media market fixed
effects, and month fixed effects. The characteristics included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share white, share
Hispanic, share unemployed, and log income per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is at the media market
by month level. Treatment is defined at the monthly level. The monthly level of searches is in logs.
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Table VI: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Violent Crime Clearance Rate, by Share of the
Population above 55
Dependent Variable
Sub-Sample Share 55+ >= Median
Share 55+ 
< Median
(1) (2)
Sinclair * Covered -0.057** -0.015
(0.023) (0.018)
Observations 7672 7664
Clusters 99 97
Municipalities 959 958
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.465 0.469
Media Market by Week FE X X
Covered by Week FE X X
Municipality FE X X
Sinclair * Controls X X
Violent Crime 
Clearance Rate
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair control on the share of crime stories that are about crime, by whether the share of the population over
55 was above the median (column (1)) or below the median (column (2)) in 2010. We regress the municipality’s violent crime clearance rate on the
interaction between between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is
covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics,
media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). The characteristics included
are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median
income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential
election. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly
level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year.
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Table VII: Effect of Sinclair Control on the Probability of Having a Local Crime Story, by
Whether the Story is about a Crime Incident or an Arrest
Dependent Variable
Type of Story Crime-Related
Arrest-
Related
(1) (2)
Sinclair * Covered -0.021*** -0.002
(0.007) (0.002)
Observations 3065194 3065194
Clusters 112 112
Municipalities 2201 2201
Stations 323 323
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.080 0.019
Station by Week FE X X
Covered by Week FE X X
Station by Municipality FE X X
Sinclair * Controls X X
Had Local Crime Story
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair control on the probability that a station reports local crime stories about covered municipalities relative
to non-covered municipalities, by whether the story is about a crime incident or is arrest-related. Arrest-related stories are stories that contain crime
bigrams related to arrests or prosecutions (e.g. "police arrested" or "murder charge") or include the string "arrest". Crime-related stories are all
other crime stories. We regress an indicator variable for the station reporting a local crime-related (column (1)) or arrest-related (column (2))
story about the municipality on the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and an indicator variable
for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and
baseline municipality characteristics, station by week fixed effects, covered status by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects
(equation (1)). The characteristics included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share
Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area,
and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-
station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in each media market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is
the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment is defined at the monthly level.
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Appendix Figures
Appendix Figure I: Local News Topics
(a) Crime (b) Events
(c) Politics (d) Weather
(e) Sports
Notes: This figure shows word clouds of the 50 words and bigrams that have the highest probability of being generated by a given topic. The size
of the word is proportional to the word’s probability.
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Appendix Figure II: Crime Bigrams, by Highest Frequency and Highest Relative Frequency
(a) Frequency (b) Relatively Frequency
Notes: This figure shows word clouds of the top 50 bigrams that we use to identify crime stories by frequency (panel (a)) and by relative frequency
(panel (b)). The size of the words is proportional to their absolute and relative frequency.
Appendix Figure III: Classification of Local Stories: Validation
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative distribution of the crime topic share separately by whether local stories are classified to be about crime or
not according to the methodology described in Section 3. Crime topic shares are from an unsupervised LDA model trained on local crime stories.
Stories are defined to be local if they mention at least one of the municipalities with more than 10,000 people in the media market.
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Appendix Figure IV: Map of Media Markets Included in the Content Sample
Notes: This map shows the share of stations for which we have content data continuously from 2010-2017 across media markets in the United
States. Darker colors correspond to higher shares of media market stations included in the content data. 61% of media market have at least one
station included in our sample, and for 88% of them the sample includes more than half of the stations present in the market.
Appendix Figure V: Relationship Between Violent Crime Rates and Share of Weeks with Local
Crime Story Before and After Sinclair Control, by Covered Status
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Notes: This figure shows how the relationship between violent crime rates and local crime reporting changes with Sinclair control, by whether a
municipality is covered at baseline or not. Panel (a) shows a binned scatter plot of the relationship between the municipality’s violent crime rate and
the share of weeks in a year in which the station reports a local crime story about the municipality, separately before and after Sinclair control, for
non-covered municipalities. Panel (b) shows the same binned scatter plot for covered municipalities. The sample is restricted to stations that ever
experienced Sinclair control. Crime rates are crimes per 1,000 people.
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Appendix Figure VI: Number of Weeks in which Municipality is Mentioned by Station in 2010
(Baseline Year) and After 2010, by Covered Status
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Notes: This figure shows that covered status persists over time. Panel (a) presents a histogram of the number of weeks in which the municipality was
mentioned by the station in 2010, by whether the municipality is covered at baseline or not. Panel (b) presents a histogram of the median number of
weeks in which the municipality was mentioned by the station after 2010, by whether a municipality is covered at baseline or not. The two vertical
lines indicate the median number of mentions for each group of municipalities. The overlap between the two distributions can be explained by
covered status being determined based on the median share of weeks in which the municipality was mentioned in 2010 across stations.
Appendix Figure VII: Differences in Socio-Economic Characteristics Between Covered and Non-
Covered Municipalities
Population
Share Male
Share Male 15 to 30
Share Over 55
Share White
Share Hispanic
Share with 2 Yrs of College
Median Income
Share Below Poverty
Share Unemployed
Area
Share Republican
 Demographic Vars
 Economic Vars
 Geographic Vars
 Electoral Vars
-.2 0 .2 .4
Coefficient Estimates, 95% CI
Notes: This figure shows along which dimensions covered and non-covered municipalities differ. We report coefficient estimates together with 95%
confidence intervals from a regression of an indicator variable for the municipality being covered at baseline on socio-economic characteristics of
the municipality and media market fixed effects. The sample is restricted to media markets that never experience Sinclair entry. Standard errors are
clustered at the media market level.
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Appendix Figure VIII: Effect of Sinclair Control on the Probability of Having a Local Crime
Story, by Semester since Treatment
P-value (β-6 = ... = β-2 = 0): 0.476
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of Sinclair control on the probability that a station reports local crime stories about covered municipalities
relative to non-covered municipalities, by semester since treatment. We report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression
of an indicator variable for the station reporting a local crime story about the municipality on the interaction between indicator variables for years
since Sinclair control and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, station by week fixed effects, covered status
by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (2)). The omitted category is T-1. Standard errors are clustered at the
media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in each media market covering the same
municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment is defined at the monthly level, but the effect is
constrained to be the same by semester since treatment.
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Appendix Figure IX: Effect of Sinclair Control for Sinclair-Controlled Stations and Other Same
Media Market Stations on the Probability of Having a Local Crime Story, by Year since Treatment
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of Sinclair entry, separately for stations directly controlled by Sinclair and for same media market stations
not directly controlled by Sinclair, on the probability that a station reports local crime stories about covered municipalities relative to non-covered
municipalities, by year since treatment. We report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of an indicator variable for
the station reporting a local crime story about the municipality on the interaction between indicator variables for years since Sinclair control and
an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline for Sinclair stations, the interaction between indicator variables for years
since Sinclair entry and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline for non-Sinclair station in a Sinclair media markets,
station by week fixed effects, covered status by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (2)). The omitted category is
T-1. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in
each media market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment is defined at
the monthly level, but the effect is constrained to be the same by year since treatment.
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Appendix Figure X: Decomposition of the Main Effect on the Probability of Having a Local
Crime Story, Differences-in-Differences Specification
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Notes: This figure reports estimates from a differences-in-differences specification with heterogeneous effects in baseline municipality exposure.
We regress the share of weeks in a month in which the station reported a local crime story about a municipality on an indicator variable for the station
being under Sinclair control, the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and dummies for the munici-
pality’s coverage quantile, the interaction between month fixed effects and municipality characteristics, time-varying media market characteristics,
state by month fixed effects, month fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (3)). The municipality characteristics included
are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median
income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential
election. The media market characteristics include log population, share male, share male 15 to 30, share white, share Hispanic, unemployment rate,
and log income per capita. The figure shows the β coefficient for the first quantile, and the linear combination of β and βk for all other quantiles,
together with 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week
panel. There are multiple stations in each media market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional
unit of interest. Treatment is defined at the monthly level.
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Appendix Figure XI: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Violent Crime Clearance Rate, by Semester
since Treatment
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Notes: This figure shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipali-
ties, by semester since treatment. We report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of the municipality’s violent crime
clearance rate on the interaction between indicator variables for years since Sinclair entry and an indicator variable for whether the municipality
is covered at baseline, media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (5)). The
omitted category is T-1. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the semester level. A media market is considered
treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market at the beginning of that semester. Clearance rates are defined as total number of crimes
cleared by arrest or exceptional means over total number of crimes.
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Figure XII: Heterogeneous Effects by Municipality Characteristics
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Notes: This figure presents the heterogeneity of the effect of Sinclair entry on local crime reporting (panel (a)) and on the violent crime clearance
rate (panel (b)). For each municipality characteristic, we estimate a separate regression model for municipalities above and below the median
according to the characteristic. The p-value reported is from a test of equality of the main coefficients across the two samples.
In panel (a), we report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of an indicator variable for the station reporting a local
crime story about the municipality on the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and an indicator
variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control
and baseline municipality characteristics, station by week fixed effects, covered status by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed
effects (equation (1)). Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are
multiple stations in each media market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest.
Treatment is defined at the monthly level.
In panel (b), we report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of the municipality’s violent crime clearance rate on the
interaction between between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is
covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics,
media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). The characteristics included
are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median
income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential
election. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly
level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year.
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Appendix Figure XIII: Decomposition of the Main Effect on Violent Clearance Rates,
Difference-in-Differences Specification
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Notes: This figure reports estimates from a differences-in-differences specification with heterogeneous effects in baseline municipality exposure. We
regress the municipality’s violent crime clearance rate on an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market, the interaction between an
indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and dummies for the municipality’s coverage quantile, the interaction between year fixed
effects and municipality characteristics, time-varying media market characteristics, state by year fixed effects, year fixed effects and municipality
fixed effects (equation (6)). The municipality characteristics included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over
55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed,
log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. The media market characteristics include log population, share
male, share male 15 to 30, share white, share Hispanic, unemployment rate and log income per capita. The figure shows the β coefficient for the
first quantile, and the linear combination of β and βk for all other quantiles, together with 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at
the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market is considered treated
in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year.
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Figure XIV: Effect of Sinclair Control on House Prices and Rents
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(b) Rents
Notes: This figure shows the effect of Sinclair entry on house prices (panel (a)) and rents (panel (b)) of covered municipalities relative to non-
covered municipalities, by year since treatment. We report coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of the outcome on
the interaction between indicator variables for years since Sinclair entry and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline,
the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair entry and year fixed effects, the municipality’s violent and property crime rates, media
market by month fixed effects, covered status by month fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (similar to equation (5)). The characteristics
included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college,
log median income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008
Presidential election. The omitted category is T-1. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year
panel. Treatment is defined at the monthly level, but the effect is constrained to be the same by year since treatment. House prices and rents are in
logs. Crime rates are crimes per 1,000 people.
Figure XV: Local News Vierwership and Political Participation, by Age
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Notes: This figure reports the share of people who reported watching local TV news in the last day (panel (a)) or attended a local political meeting
in the last year (panel (b)), separately for individuals below and above 55. Data are from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.
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Appendix Tables
Appendix Table I: Sample Summary
Overall
Included in 
the Content 
Analysis
(1) (2)
# of Stations 835 323
# of Stations Ever Controlled by Sinclair 121 38
# of Stations Ever Owned and Operated by Sinclair 110 37
# of Stations Ever Owned and Operated by Cunningham 10 1
# of Stations Ever Controlled by Sinclair through a Local Marketing Agreement 10 4
Notes: This table presents summary counts for full-powered commercial TV stations affiliated with a big four network 2010-2017, separately for
all stations (column (1)) and for the sample of stations included in the content analysis (column (2)).
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Table IV: Effect of Sinclair Control on the Probability of Having a Local Story, by Type
Dependent Variable Had Local Story Crime Non-Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Sinclair * Covered -0.038*** -0.021*** -0.017
(0.012) (0.007) (0.013)
Observations 3065194 3065194 3065194
Clusters 112 112 112
Municipalities 2201 2201 2201
Stations 323 323 323
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.242 0.089 0.153
Station by Week FE X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X
Station by Municipality FE X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X
Decomposition
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair control on the probability that a station reports a local story about covered municipalities relative to
non-covered municipalities, overall (column (1)) and by whether the story is about crime (columns (2) and (3)). We regress the outcome on the
interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered
at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and baseline municipality characteristics, station
by week fixed effects, covered status by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (1)). The characteristics included are
log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median
income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential
election. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple
stations in each media market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment
is defined at the monthly level.
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Appendix Table V: Effect of Sinclair Control on Overall Crime Coverage, by Whether Story is
Local
Dependent Variable
Share of 
Stories 
about 
Crime
Local Non-Local
(1) (2) (3)
Sinclair -0.009* -0.011*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 135014 135014 135014
Clusters 112 112 112
Municipalities 323 323 323
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.131 0.061 0.070
Station FE X X X
Week FE X X X
Media Market Controls X X X
Decomposition
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair control on the share of crime stories that are about crime, by whether the story is local or not, using
a differences-in-differences specification. We define a story to be local if it mentions at least one of the municipalities with more than 10,000
people in the media market. We regress the outcome on an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control, baseline media market
characteristics interacted with week fixed effects, station fixed effects, and week fixed effects. The characteristics included are log population, share
male, share male between 15 and 30, share white, share Hispanic, share unemployed, and log income per capita. Standard errors are clustered at
the media market level. The dataset is a station by week panel. Treatment is defined at the monthly level.
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Appendix Table VI: Effect of Sinclair Control on the Probability of Having a Local Crime Story,
by Political Leaning of the Municipality
Dependent Variable
Sub-Sample
Share 
Republican 
>= Median
Share 
Republican 
< Median
(1) (2)
Sinclair * Covered -0.018*** -0.019
(0.006) (0.012)
Observations 1526536 1519012
Clusters 98 82
Municipalities 1097 1087
Stations 283 240
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.076 0.100
Station by Week FE X X
Covered by Week FE X X
Station by Municipality FE X X
Sinclair * Controls X X
Had Local Crime Story
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair control on the share of crime stories that are about crime, splitting the sample by whether the
municipality’s Republican vote share was above (column (1)) or below (column (2)) the median in the 2008 Presidential election. We regress an
indicator variable for the station reporting a local crime story about the municipality on the interaction between an indicator variable for the station
being under Sinclair control and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, interactions between an indicator variable
for the station being under Sinclair control and baseline municipality characteristics, station by week fixed effects, covered status by week fixed
effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (1)). The characteristics included are log population, share male, share male between
15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of population below the poverty
rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Standard errors are clustered at the
media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in each media market covering the same
municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment is defined at the monthly level.
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Appendix Table VII: Effect of Sinclair Control on the Probability of Having a Local Crime
Story, by Type of Crime
Dependent Variable
Type of Crime Violent Property
(1) (2)
Sinclair * Covered -0.017*** -0.004**
(0.006) (0.002)
Observations 3065194 3065194
Clusters 112 112
Municipalities 2201 2201
Stations 323 323
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.067 0.013
Station by Week FE X X
Covered by Week FE X X
Station by Municipality FE X X
Sinclair * Controls X X
Had Local Crime Story
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair control on the probability that a station reports local crime stories about covered municipalities relative
to non-covered municipalities, by type of crime. We regress an indicator variable for the station reporting a local crime story about the municipality
on the interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is
covered at baseline, interactions between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and baseline municipality characteristics,
station by week fixed effects, covered status by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (1)). The characteristics
included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college,
log median income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008
Presidential election. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are
multiple stations in each media market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest.
Treatment is defined at the monthly level.
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Appendix Table VIII: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Violent Crime Rate, by Type of Crime
Dependent Variable Violent Crime Rate Murder Assault Robbery Rape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sinclair * Covered 0.105 0.002 0.077 0.050* -0.025
(0.115) (0.004) (0.096) (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 15488 15488 15488 15488 15488
Clusters 112 112 112 112 112
Municipalities 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936
Outcome Mean in 2010 3.536 0.037 2.203 0.961 0.324
Sinclair * Covered - 0.022 0.008 -0.003 0.032*
- (0.033) (0.007) (0.010) (0.016)
Observations - 15488 15488 15488 15488
Clusters - 112 112 112 112
Municipalities 1936 1936 1936 1936
Outcome Mean in 2010 - 0.478 0.904 0.967 0.941
Media Market by Week FE X X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X X X
By Type of Crime
Panel A: Crime Rates
Panel B: Dummy = 1 if at least one Crime
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the crime rates of covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities, for different
types of violent crimes. We regress the municipality’s crime rate for a given type of violent crime on the interaction between between an indicator
variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the interaction
between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics, media market by year fixed
effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). The characteristics included are log population, share
male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of
population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Standard
errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market
is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. In panel A, reports outcomes are defined as
crime rates; in panel B, outcomes are defined as indicator variables for experiencing at least one crime. Crime rates are defined as crimes per 1,000
people.
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Appendix Table IX: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Property Crime Rate, by Type of Crime
Dependent Variable Property Crime Rate Burglary Theft
Motor 
Vehicle 
Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sinclair * Covered 1.195* 0.599*** 0.706 0.111
(0.685) (0.219) (0.569) (0.073)
Observations 15488 15488 15488 15488
Clusters 112 112 112 112
Municipalities 1936 1936 1936 1936
Outcome Mean in 2010 33.385 7.156 24.208 2.010
Media Market by Week FE X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X X
By Type of Crime
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the crime rate of covered municipalities relative to non-covered municipalities, for different
types of property crimes. We regress the municipality’s crime rate for a given type of property crime on the interaction between between an
indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the
interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics, media market by year
fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). The characteristics included are log population,
share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of
population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Standard
errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market
is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. Crime rates are defined crimes per 1,000 people.
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Appendix Table X: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Police Spending and Employment
Data Source
Dependent Variable
Police 
Expend. 
Per Capita
Judicial 
Expend. 
Per Capita
Police 
Employees 
per 1,000 
People
Police 
Employees 
per 1,000 
People
Police 
Officers 
per 1,000 
People
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sinclair * Covered -0.005 -0.003* 0.002 -0.034 -0.017
(0.005) (0.001) (0.154) (0.028) (0.021)
Observations 9325 9325 10512 15487 15487
Clusters 110 110 112 112 112
Municipalies 1512 1512 1669 1936 1936
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.239 0.019 2.960 2.368 1.851
Media Market by Week FE X X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X X X
Census of Government UCR
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the spending and employment of police departments of covered municipalities relative to
non-covered municipalities. We regress the municipality’s spending or employment measure on the interaction between an indicator variable for
Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, media market by year fixed
effects, covered status by year fixed effects, covered status by media market fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). Outcome
variables are normalized by population. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel.
Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of
that year.
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Appendix Table XI: Effect of Sinclair Entry on Police Violence
Dependent Variable Any Fatality
Any White 
Fatality
Any 
Minority 
Fatality
(1) (2) (3)
Sinclair * Covered -0.040 -0.031 -0.004
(0.032) (0.026) (0.020)
Observations 15488 15488 15488
Clusters 112 112 112
Municipalies 1936 1936 1936
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.141 0.057 0.072
Media Market by Week FE X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X
Municipality FE X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X
Notes: This table shows the effect of Sinclair entry on the probability of experiencing an officer-involved fatality in covered municipalities relative to
non-covered municipalities. We regress an indicator variable equal to 1 if the municipality experienced an officer-involved fatality on the interaction
between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline,
media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, covered status by media market fixed effects, and municipality fixed effects
(equation (4)). Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly
level. A media market is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year. Data on officer-involved
fatality is from Fatal Encounters.
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Appendix Table XIII: Effect of Sinclair Control on the Probability of Having a Local Crime
Story, No Staggered Timing
Dependent Variable
Restricted to Stations 
Treated in…
December 
2012 
(Newport)
August 
2013 
(Fisher)
November 
2013 
(Barrington)
August 
2014 
(Allbritton)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sinclair * Covered -0.045*** -0.022*** -0.047 -0.014**
(0.010) (0.006) (0.052) (0.007)
Observations 2927254 2948154 2924328 2926000
Clusters 111 111 111 111
Municipalities 2193 2193 2193 2193
Stations 301 300 302 300
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.087 0.086 0.087 0.086
Station by Week FE X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X
Station by Municipality FE X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X X
Had Local Crime Story
Notes: This table shows the robustness of the effect of Sinclair control on the probability that a station reports a local story about covered mu-
nicipalities relative to non-covered municipalities to eliminating variation in treatment coming from the staggered timing of Sinclair control. In
particular, we restrict the sample to stations that were never under Sinclair control, stations always under Sinclair control, and stations that were
acquired by Sinclair in the month specified in the column header. We only estimate separately months in which Sinclair acquired control of more
than three stations. We regress an indicator variable for the station reporting a local crime story about the municipality on the interaction between
an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the
interaction between an indicator variable for the station being under Sinclair control and baseline municipality characteristics, station by week fixed
effects, covered status by week fixed effects, and station by municipality fixed effects (equation (1)). The characteristics included are log population,
share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55, share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of
population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Standard
errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality-station pair by week panel. There are multiple stations in each media
market covering the same municipalities, and the municipality-station pair is the cross-sectional unit of interest. Treatment is defined at the monthly
level.
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Appendix Table XV: Effect of Sinclair Entry on the Violent Crime Clearance Rate, No Staggered
Timing
Dependent Variable
Restricted to Media Markets 
Treated in… 2012 2013 2014 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sinclair * Covered -0.068* -0.056** -0.033* 0.000
(0.035) (0.027) (0.018) (0.009)
Observations 12824 12456 13640 12816
Clusters 84 83 94 86
Municipalities 1603 1557 1705 1602
Outcome Mean in 2010 0.460 0.456 0.461 0.459
Media Market by Week FE X X X X
Covered by Week FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Sinclair * Controls X X X X
Violent Crime Clearance Rate
Notes: This table shows the robustness of the effect of Sinclair entry on the violent crime clearance rate of covered municipalities relative to
non-covered municipalities to eliminating variation in treatment coming from the staggered timing of Sinclair entry. In particular, we restrict the
sample to media markets that were never exposed to Sinclair, media markets that were always exposed to Sinclair, and media markets that were
acquired by Sinclair in the year specified in the column header. We only estimate separately years in which Sinclair entered more than three media
markets. We regress the municipality’s violent crime clearance rate on the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair presence in the
media market and an indicator variable for whether the municipality is covered at baseline, the interaction between an indicator variable for Sinclair
presence in the media market and baseline municipality characteristics, media market by year fixed effects, covered status by year fixed effects, and
municipality fixed effects (equation (4)). The characteristics included are log population, share male, share male between 15 and 30, share over 55,
share white, share Hispanic, share with 2 years of college, log median income, share of population below the poverty rate, share unemployed, log
municipality area, and Republican vote share in the 2008 Presidential election. Standard errors are clustered at the media market level. Standard
errors are clustered at the media market level. The dataset is a municipality by year panel. Treatment is defined at the yearly level. A media market
is considered treated in a given year if Sinclair was present in the market in the January of that year Clearance rates are defined as total number of
crimes cleared by arrest or exceptional means over total number of crimes.
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Appendix A – Text Analysis
Separating Newscasts into News Stories
We segment each newscast into separate stories using an automated procedure based on content
similarity across sentences. We begin by selecting the number of stories each newscast is composed
of using texttiling (Hearst, 1997), an algorithm that divides texts into passages by identifying shifts
in content based on word co-occurrence. We then divide sentences into passages using the Con-
tent Vector Segmentation methodology proposed by Alemi and Ginsparg (2015), which identifies
content shifts by leveraging the representation of sentences into a vector space using word embed-
dings. In addition, we show that our results are robust to a simple segmentation procedure that
separates the newscast into stories of 130 tokens, based on the fact that the average person speaks
at around 130 words per minute.
Classifying Local Crime News
We build a classifier model that assigns a specific type of crime to each of the 415,604 local news
stories in our sample. To train the model, we need a sub-sample of the stories to be labeled with
the correct crime type. We create this sub-sample by performing a naive keyword search, using the
following keywords:
1. Murder: MURDER, HOMICID, KILLE;
2. Assault: ASSAULT;
3. Robbery: ROBBE;
4. Rape: RAPE, SEXUAL ASSAULT;
5. Burglary: BURGLAR;
6. Theft: THIEF, STEAL, STOLE, THEFT.
We selected these terms to minimize the presence of false positives. In fact, we checked using the
full vocabulary that these keywords return tokens and bigrams that appear to be closely related to
the crime considered. The training sample is then defined to be the sample of crime stories that
contain at least one of the keywords (205,299 stories). Because it is difficult to distinguish between
assault and rapes and burglary and theft, we classify stories into three categories: stories about
murder, stories about other violent crimes (assault, robbery, and rape), and stories about property
crimes (burglary and theft). Because a story can potentially cover different types of crimes, we
train separate binary models for each category.
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We use this sub-sample to train a classifier model. In particular, we train a support vector machine
model using stochastic gradient descent. The features that are used to predict the label are the
top most frequent 25,000 tokens and bigrams in the full corpus. We exclude the keyword used to
define the original labels from the features, as they contain significant information for the training
sample, but we already know that we will not be able to leverage this information for out-of-sample
predictions. The features are TF-IDF weighted. We train the model on 80% of the sample, and use
the remaining 20% as a test sample to evaluate model performance.
We find that the three models perform well, with F1-scores of 0.83 (murder), 0.77 (other violent
crimes), and 0.80 (property). Appendix B Figure I shows the most predictive feature for each
category. Reassuringly, the features selected by the different models appear to intuitively link to
the respective crimes. We use the models to predict the category of the remaining 210,305 stories.
Using this method, we are able to assign a crime type to 85% of all local crime stories.
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Appendix B Figure I: Most Predictive Features for News Type Classifier
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Notes: This figure shows the most predictive features for the classification models used to identify the content of local crime news.
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